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Heritage of the Yoga Philosophy and 
Transcendental Phenomenology: 
The Interlocution of Knowledge and 
Wisdom across Two Traditions of Philosophy
Koshy Tharakan
Today we possess all sorts of studies on Indian, Chinese, and 
other philosophies, studies that place these philosophies on the 
same level with Greek philosophy, considering them merely as 
different historical formulations of one and the same cultural 
idea. . . Before anything else, the attitude of these two kinds 
of "philosophers," the overall orientation of their interests, is 
thoroughly different... Only with the Greeks, however, do we 
find a universal ("cosmological") vital interest in the essentially 
new form of a purely "theoretical" attitude1.
Benjamin Franklin reports the unique advantage of the dual 
vision that bifocals offered to him during his visit of France:
I find [bifocals] more particularly convenient since my being 
in France, the glasses that serve me best at table to see what I 
eat not being the best to see the face of those on the other side 
of the table who speak to me; and when one's ears are not well 
accustomed to the sounds of a language, a sight of the move­
ments in the features of him that speaks helps to explain; so 
that I understand French better by the help of my spectacles2.
The advantage of comparative philosophy consists precisely 
in enabling a vision of the other tradition. Contrary to Hus­
serl's claims that philosophy, as a pure "theoretical attitude", 
is uniquely European as according to him the theoretical atti­
tude began only with the Greeks, in many systems of Indian 
philosophy we encounter similar theoretical attitude3.
The discourse on 'self' and 'consciousness' is central to al­
most all systems of Indian Philosophy as it is with the wont of 
any school of Western philosophy. Thus, for all classical schools
of philosophy in India, except the "Càrvàka" materialist school, 
the ultimate goal of philosophizing is the attainment of “Moksa" 
(liberation of the self/ freedom of the self from ignorance-bond- 
age). The philosophy of Yoga as espoused by the sage Patanjali 
in his Yoga Sutra is foremost in delineating the path to liberation, 
which it construes as "Kaivalya"- the state in which the individ­
ual self abides in itself, without any fluctuations towards the 
world of everyday reality. Though different schools of Indian 
Philosophy emphasize different paths to the attainment of 
Mokja like Jhâna Mârga (path of knowledge), Bhakti Mârga (path 
of devotion) and Karma Mârga (path of action), underlying all 
these paths is Sâdhanâ — a "discipline" cultivated by intense 
reflection on self and consciousness. The best exemplification 
of Sâdhanâ is found in the Yoga philosophy of Patanjali. The 
paper argues that Sâdhanâ has striking similarity with and is 
the practical counterpart of the theoretical move aimed at "Re­
duction" in Husserlian phenomenology.
The term 'Yoga' has different connotation and its meaning 
differs in different kinds of Yoga (such as Raja Yoga, Hatha 
Yoga, Karma Yoga, and Bhakti Yoga). Semantically, the word 
'Yoga' is a derivative of the Sanskrit verbal root 'Yuj', meaning 
'to yoke' or 'to join' or 'to unite'. In its wider use, Yoga refers 
to the arithmetical operation of addition, planetary conjunction 
that brings certain consequences for the individual in astrolo­
gy, and the syntactical formation of words in grammar. S. C. 
Banerji in his Studies in Origin and Development of Yoga men­
tions the different meanings of Yoga such as 'skill in work', 
'desireless action', 'acquisition of true knowledge', 'indifference 
to pleasure and pain', addition in arithmetic and conjunction 
in astronomy.4 Swami Prabhupada writes: "Yoga means the 
connecting link between the soul and the Supersoul, or the 
Supreme and the minute living creatures."5 Veda-Vyâsa has 
written a commentary on Yoga-Bhâsya to Patanjali's Yoga Sxitra 
and Vâcaspati-Misra has provided an explanation ('vivararia') of 
the Yoga-Bhàsya called Tattva-vaicârâdi. In this work, Vàcaspa- 
ti-Misra points out that when Vyâsa defines Yoga provision­
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ally as 'concentration' (Samàdhi), he uses the term Yoga in its 
etymological derivation from the stem 'Yuj-a' in the sense of 
'concentration' and not 'conjunction'6. Thus, we may take the 
connotation of 'Yoga' in the philosophy of Patanjali as 'concen­
tration' rather than 'union'. Such an understanding of Yoga as 
'concentration' would lead us to recognize that 'Sâdhanâ' as 
underlying the Yogic practice is equivalent to the 'phenom­
enological reduction' in the Husserlian phenomenology on a 
theoretical plane. According to Husserl, the way we tarry in 
the life-world is from a 'natural attitude', an attitude that takes 
for granted the existence of phenomena we encounter in our 
everyday experience. In order to attend to the way in which 
these phenomena get constituted in our experience, we need 
to enter into a 'phenomenological attitude' from the 'natural 
attitude'. For Husserl, phenomenological reduction is the gate­
way to such an attitude. Much like sâdhanâ, phenomenological 
reduction too is a practice that needs to be cultivated in order 
to move out of the 'default' attitude —the natural attitude—to 
enter into the phenomenological attitude.
Patanjali in Yoga Sütra, First Book (Samàdhi Pâda) second 
Sütra states the distinguishing characteristic of Yoga as "the 
restriction of the fluctuations of mind-stuff". Later in Sütra I.
12 it is stated that the means of restriction of the fluctuations 
consist in'Practice' ('abhyàsa') and'Passionlessness' ('vairâgya'). 
Vairâgya arrests the flow of mind-stuff towards objects whereas 
the practice of 'discriminatory knowledge' opens up ' Viveka' or 
'discrimination'. Only when these two are practiced together 
will the restriction be achieved. Practice that is 'abhyàsa' is an 
effort (prayatna) with the goal of attaining permanence in the 
restricted state. Such 'discriminatory-practice', that is abhyàsa 
coupled with vairàgya finally leads to "Kaivalya" (Yoga Sütra I. 
16) wherein the "Self abides in himself" (Yoga Sütra I. 3). The 
'discriminatory-practice' ('Sâdhanâ') of Yoga may be read in 
terms of Husserl's concept of 'Phenomenological Reduction' 
as enabling the transition from the 'natural attitude' to the 
phenomenological attitude — or in the case of Yoga as enabling 
to attain the state where the "Self abides in himself".
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According to Husserl all sciences except phenomenology 
remain in the natural attitude. Their aim is to cognize the world 
comprehensively and reliably as it confronts us, from the natural 
standpoint. The greatest impediment to cognition is that, in nat­
ural standpoint, the style of research will always be one-sided, 
as they take for granted the objects or phenomena that appear 
in our experience. The phenomenological attitude on the other 
hand, sets aside all such prevailing habits of thinking. It helps 
us to develop a method -  the method of reduction by which we 
are able to 'transcendentally purify' the phenomena, that opens 
the proper direction of regard to every cognition. The general 
positing, the characteristic of natural attitude, is a consciousness 
of the object as actually existing. This natural attitude is not an 
accidental or particular act; rather it is a continuous attitude 
throughout the natural life. One might characterize it as the de­
fault attitude. The reduction opens up a true ontological realm of 
pure or absolute consciousness. Thus, from its epistemological 
starting point Phenomenology reaches to an ontological realm.7 
The reduction operates at two levels, the objective sphere as well 
as the consciousness-sphere, simultaneously. Both the object 
posited and the act of positing is subjected to reduction. Thus, 
by phenomenological reduction (epoché/ bracketing) the object 
is bracketed and the act is put out of action.8 The whole world 
and its objects posited in the natural attitude cease to be valid 
for us. Then, phenomenological reduction is the operation nec­
essary to make pure consciousness and subsequently the whole 
phenomenological region, accessible to us. The term 'reduction' 
characterizes the turn towards transcendental phenomenology. 
It provides the conditions of the possibility of the empirical 
knowledge of being as well as the sense of being itself.
Husserl talks about three stages of reductions. The first 
reduction or 'phenomenological reduction' effectuates the ex­
clusion of the natural world and the corresponding sciences. 
Thus, the first reduction is the gateway to the phenomenological 
regard or attitude. Thus, the turn towards the phenomeno­
logical attitude is called the phenomenological reduction. The
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'eidetic reduction' deals with material and formal essences 
that are transcendent. In it, all references to the particulars are 
withheld and the essences are brought to light. In an eidetic 
enquiry, the greatest handicap is that one is tempted to "psy­
chologize the eidetic" and thereby ends up in Idealism. In 
other words, idealism is a result of the confusion of essences 
with the resulting consciousness of the essences. Thus, eidetic 
reduction vindicates the eidetic as eidetic. Husserl makes a 
distinction between the essence of something 'immanent' and 
essence of something 'transcendent'. That is between "essences 
of formations belonging to consciousness itself" and "essences 
of individual affairs transcendent to consciousness." The lat­
ter is constituted in the consciousness by virtue of sensuous 
appearances. Now, Husserl reminds us that the eidetic reduc­
tion is confined to the eidetic of the transcendent.9 The eidetic 
science, however, remains a positive science as it restrains the 
validity of the natural apperception of the world. When we 
inactivate this by means of transcendental reduction we enter 
the realm of the transcendental phenomenology.10 The third 
reduction is transcendental reduction. It brackets all references 
to the transcendent as the intentional correlation of our acts. 
Thus the world becomes a world-phenomenon. This universal 
epoché transforms our attitude in the 'life-world'. Through this 
reduction we discover the correlation between the world and 
world-consciousness. Transcendental reduction liberates one 
from the internal bond of the pre-givenness of the world to a 
realm of absolutely self-enclosed and absolutely self-sufficient 
domain of consciousness. It reveals the transcendental subjec­
tivity, which validates the world.
The method of reduction in phenomenology should not be 
confused with Cartesian method of doubt. Cartesian doubt is 
an abstention from an existential belief in order to attain cer­
tainty of knowledge. Phenomenological reduction or epoché, on 
the other hand is the disclosure of a belief as a belief. The one 
who practises epoché is already detached in principle from the 
belief. The epoché then is a means to reinforce and confirm this
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detachment. Thus the epoché is a peculiar mode of conscious­
ness and contrary to Cartesian doubt, does not present itself 
as a negated belief. As an act, it offers itself for noetic analysis, 
thereby uncovering the hidden intentional acts. However, its 
noematic correlate is the experience of the belief in the world. 
Hence the epoché does not negate the existence of the world, but 
retains it intentionally. As Stroker points out:
This correlative structure of the reduced noema must be tak­
en into consideration when one inquiries into the sense and 
achievement of the universal epoché. If one overlooks this, one 
runs the danger of misinterpreting the epoché in such a way that 
one thinks of the phenomenological on-looker, who utilizes the 
epoché, as being exclusively turned to the subjective contents of 
experience and no longer interested in the being of the world 
at all. But the epoché is not meant to lead me to the stream o f my 
act-life because I want to take my leave of the world, as if it were 
something that could be separated from this stream; rather it leads 
me to this stream because the world, and all being, is contained in it 
intentionally.11
Thus transcendental reduction shows that all questions pertain­
ing to being can only be raised within transcendental subjectiv­
ity. It is in transcendental subjectivity that the justification of 
being is carried out. What the transcendental reduction offers 
us is the realm of absolute consciousness or transcendental sub­
jectivity. Pure consciousness is the phenomenological residuum 
and is the theme for its investigations. Husserl reiterates that 
with 'reduction', " . . .  we have not lost anything but rather have 
gained the whole of absolute being which, rightly understood, 
contains within itself, "constitutes" within itself, all worldly 
transcendencies" } 2
With the transcendental reduction, human beings as persons 
in association with fellow human beings living in a society are 
excluded as what remains after the reduction is the pure sub­
jectivity—the transcendental ego. The pure subjectivity or ego 
is something necessarily present in all cogitations; nevertheless,
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it is not a part or moment inherent in the mental processes 
themselves13. The pure or transcendental ego is transcendence 
within immanence. It is the primal region of all being. All 
other regions of being are rooted in and essentially relative to 
the region of transcendental (pure) consciousness. The phenom­
enological reduction makes a radical ontological distinction: 
being as consciousness and being as something which becomes 
"manifested" in consciousness.
The phenomenological method operates in the acts of reflec­
tion. Reflection is the ego's living in its mental processes. In 
other words, it is " . . .  the name of the method of consciousness 
leading to the cognition of any consciousness whatever."14 In 
phenomenology, reflection itself becomes an object of study 
as by reflection, we also mean a group of mental processes 
that are essentially united. Such a reflective analysis reveals 
the intentional structure of consciousness. Intentionality is the 
essential peculiarity of consciousness. "Intentionality is what 
characterizes consciousness in the pregnant sense and which, at 
the same time, justifies designating the whole stream of men­
tal processes as the stream of consciousness and as the unity 
of one consciousness."15 Intentionality is the directedness of 
consciousness. According to Husserl, consciousness, in almost 
all instances, is always directed to some object. In other words, 
consciousness is consciousness of something. The phenom­
enological analysis of consciousness reveals the noesis-noema 
structure of experience. Noesis is the objectifying act and no- 
ema is the intended object. Noesis and noema correspond to 
the subject and object poles of experience respectively. Every 
noesis has its corresponding noema. However, the same object 
can be apprehended differently. That is to say that the many 
intended objects may refer to the same object grasped in varying 
intending acts. This implies that there is an underlying unity 
or identity of different 'noemata' of varying acts. Without this 
unity we cannot support any claim to objectivity. If we maintain 
the right attitude and obey the clear eidetic data without any 
prejudice, the same insight can be had for everyone.
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Thus, Husserl says:
. . . firm results are directly produced, and the same thing oc­
curs for everyone having the same attitude; there accrue firm 
possibilities of communicating to others what one has himself 
seen, of testing descriptions, of making salient the unnoticed 
intrusions of empty verbal meanings, of making known and 
weeding out errors by measuring them again against intuition.16
From the above discussion, we see that the phenomeno­
logical reduction that Husserl performed was free from any 
preconceived notions about the reality of the world and was 
aimed at opening up the domain of pure consciousness by a 
cultivated mode of reflection. In a similar tone, Patanjali states: 
"the knowledge of the Self arises as the result of constraint upon 
that which exists for its own sake" (Yoga Sütra III. 35). Constraint 
or 'Samyama' is a technical term in yoga referring to 'dhâranà' 
(concentration), 'dhyâna' (meditation), and 'samàdhi' (the final 
stage of meditation where the meditating consciousness loses 
its own form). Again, in Yoga Sütra IV.22 it is mentioned that 
"the intellect (citi) which unites not [with objects] is conscious 
of its own thinking-substance when the [mind-stuff] takes the 
form of that [thinking substance by reflecting it]."
In Yoga Sütra, the Second and the Third books, namely 
Sâdhanâ Pàda and Vibhûti Pàda explain the five external or in­
direct aids to yoga and the three direct or internal aids to yoga. 
Thus, we have been told that an aspirant for yogic knowledge 
must prepare himself/herself by these external aids, which 
include Yama, Niyama, Àsana, Prânâyâma, and Prathyâhâra in 
order to embark upon the practices of Dhâranà, Dhyâna and 
Samàdhi. Yama and Niyama preclude uncontrolled desires and 
emotions, whereas Asana and Prânâyâma eliminate disturbances 
arising from the physical body. The function of Pratyâhâra is 
the withdrawal of sense organs from the mind thus cutting it 
off from the external world and the sense impressions it pro­
duces on the mind. Puligandla identifies this preparatory stage 
(.Pratyâhâra) as the yogic counter part of the phenomenological
reduction17. However, we argue that it is not just 'Pratyâhàra', 
but the entire 'Sâdhanâ'- the 'discriminatory practice' that 
should be construed as similar to the phenomenological re­
duction. In Husserlian phenomenology, 'phenomenological 
reduction' refers not only to the withdrawal of senses that cuts 
off the mind from the world, but to enter a new way of looking 
at the world in which objectivity is seen as constituted in the 
subjectivity itself. This phenomenological seeing is attained 
through a disciplined reflection on consciousness which is like 
the 'discriminatory-practice' of yoga. Nevertheless, as Sinari 
has pointed out the crucial difference between phenomeno­
logical reduction and yogic meditation consists in the fact that 
phenomenological transcendental reduction does not amount 
to total annulment of the reflective activity of consciousness, 
whereas the Yogic meditation precisely aims at such a state of 
transcendental subjectivity, where the subjectivity releases itself 
into a state beyond the conscious activity— the highest state of 
" Samâdhi."18 This is so, because unlike Husserlian phenome­
nology, the Yoga philosophy does not construe 'intentional- 
ity' —the directedness of consciousness or the 'aboutness' of 
consciousness as an intrinsic feature of consciousness.
In contrast to the Husserlian understanding of "theory" 
as "pure knowledge", Gadamer offers a different account. 
According to Gadamer, 'theoria' in the sense of a detached the­
oretical approach based on a reflective consciousness is a later 
development. The primordial meaning of theoria in the Greek 
thought is to participate in an event — a sharing that emphasizes 
being present. As Gadamer notes, the earlier meaning of theoria 
has to do with taking part in a delegation to a festival meant 
to honour the gods.19 Strikingly, this original Greek concept of 
'theoria' as a "social practice" resonates with the Yoga notion of 
'sâdhanâ'- the 'discriminatory practice', albeit sans the "social" 
dimension of practice as the emphasis of Yoga philosophy is 
not so much on the social dimension of the practice of sâdhanâ.
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Our reading of phenomenological reduction in the light of 
yogic sâdhanâ helps us to recognize firstly how despite Husserl's 
own avowed claim that philosophy is distinctively a Western 
intellectual achievement, his own philosophy has striking par­
allels in the Eastern philosophical thought. Secondly, sâdhanâ 
as a "theoretical practice" understood in the context of Ga- 
damer's retrieval of the original sense of 'theoria' as a "social 
practice" helps us to reinstate the cultural heritage and wisdom 
embedded in local and regional identities marginalized by 
Globalization even while appreciating the shared commonal­
ities between two traditions of philosophy. Perhaps, such an 
understanding of Indian philosophy was not available during 
Husserl's time—it required a gradual but continuous seeping 
of traditions and tendencies in our milieu of globalization of 
ideas to reject such 'Eurocentric' notions of philosophy as it 
had to await the availability of "cultural bifocals" or "fusion 
of horizons" in the Gadamerian sense.
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